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THE ENDS OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY: HEALTH AS A CASE STUDY
ARTI K. RAI*
I
INTRODUCTION
On the tenth anniversary of James Boyle’s pathbreaking examination of
intellectual property, it is appropriate to reflect upon “big” questions in the
field. Such reflection is particularly apposite in my case, as my decision to
become an intellectual property scholar was greatly influenced by Boyle’s book,
Shamans, Software, and Spleens.1 Madhavi Sunder’s essay identifies one of these
big questions when she suggests that the book may place undue emphasis on
wealth maximization as a normative criterion.2 Whether Sunder’s critique is
entirely fair is an open question. Indeed, in Boyle’s carefully chosen examples
of traditional knowledge, increasing overall wealth does not conflict with
distributional considerations. If traditional resources held by poor people are
taken from them without compensation, they will fail to invest in resource
maintenance. In turn, the Western pharmaceutical firms that are dependent on
these resources to secure large revenue streams will suffer. In Boyle’s discussion
of traditional knowledge, as in some real-life cases, equity and efficiency work
in harmony.
Of course, equity can be in tension with efficiency. Some commentators
have observed, for example, that national or tribal assertions of rights over
genetic resources may create anti-commons effects for researchers who need
access to materials that come from a variety of different geographical areas. In
the domestic context, there is considerable concern that assertions of property
rights by patients who are “sources” of genetic material may impede medical
research. More generally, Sunder’s critique raises an important problem for
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intellectual property law and perhaps especially for patent law. In contrast with
copyright scholarship, which is inflected with concerns about free speech and
which therefore routinely takes account of issues other than wealth, patent law
scholars have often accepted wealth maximization as the normative criterion by
which they evaluate regulatory proposals in their field. Wealth maximization
means Kaldor-Hicks efficiency: a proposal is superior to possible alternatives if
the winners could in theory compensate the losers. As contrasted with Paretosuperiority, Kaldor-Hicks efficiency is not a normative criterion, at least if by
normative one means moral. A regime that is Kaldor-Hicks efficient is merely
potentially Pareto-superior. There is no need for the regime actually to be
Pareto-superior.3
As contrasted with Kaldor-Hicks efficiency or wealth maximization,
increasing welfare is a morally compelling criterion. Even if one does not accept
welfare as the determinative criterion,4 it is difficult to quarrel with the
proposition that welfare matters. Moreover, a focus on welfare can incorporate
the goal of giving greater weight to those with lower welfare levels.5 Attempts to
evaluate intellectual property policy through the lens of welfare are associated,
however, with two familiar problems: first, there is the difficulty of identifying
tractable metrics for welfare. Although wealth can be measured quite readily,
measuring welfare is much more difficult.6 The second difficulty is institutional:
are welfare considerations that diverge from wealth maximization best
addressed through regulatory regimes other than intellectual property? This
brief commentary addresses these two questions.
II
MEASURING WELFARE
Many philosophers and economists have written eloquently on the subject
of welfare. Recapitulating those discussions is unnecessary here. Rather, I will
focus on systematic attempts to measure welfare. The World Health
Organization “Quality of Life” (WHOQOL) index, which has been developed
and tested over thousands of people in different countries and which aims to
assess individuals’ perception of their life circumstances in the context of their
own culture and value systems represents one of the more comprehensive
attempts to develop a metric of overall welfare. The WHOQOL index produces

3. Matt Adler and Eric Posner have made this argument, as have other scholars. See, e.g.,
Matthew D. Adler & Eric A. Posner, Rethinking Cost-Benefit Analysis, 109 YALE L.J. 165, 187–94
(1999).
4. Some would have welfare be the sole criterion. See generally LOUIS KAPLOW & STEVEN
SHAVELL, FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE (2002).
5. For example, in making distributional decisions, an analyst might give additional weight to the
welfare of poor individuals on the theory that wealth has declining marginal utility. Of course, such
weighting presupposes the possibility of interpersonal utility comparisons. But many economists and
philosophers accept that possibility.
6. Measuring welfare is a problem even if one accepts the possibility of interpersonal welfare
comparisons.
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a multi-dimensional profile of scores across six domains (the physical domain,
the psychological domain, levels of independence, social relationships, the
environment, and the spiritual domain). Such a multi-dimensional profile has
the virtue of breadth. Moreover, it does not attempt to make commensurate
spheres of welfare that may be incommensurable. Whether it would represent a
tractable mechanism for measuring the effect of a given policy intervention is
less clear.7
As contrasted with the WHOQOL index, an index of welfare used by many
public health and safety economists, the quality-adjusted life year (QALY), has
been shown to be quite tractable. In the United States, presidential
administrations dating back to Ronald Reagan have required cost-benefit
analysis of major rulemaking.8 In the context of public health and safety
regulations, this has included the possibility of analysis based on QALYs.9
Additionally, many countries, including Britain, Canada, and Australia,
currently use QALY-based systems for determining which technologies should
be covered under their national health-care systems.10 Under a QALY-based
approach (also known as cost-effectiveness analysis), an intervention is
evaluated according to the additional life-years it yields, as adjusted by the
quality of those life-years. Quality of life, in turn, is measured on a scale of zero
to one (zero being death and one being perfect health) using survey instruments
that focus on trade-offs between different health states. One standard
instrument is the time trade-off: if the average person in perfect health reported
that she would consider a lifespan that was twenty percent shorter than a full
life span to be equivalent to a full life span in a given (suboptimal) health state
X, then that state X would be rated at 0.8 on the zero to one scale. Moreover, a
medical intervention that took a person with disease X and returned her to full
health for the remaining twenty years of her life would confer a welfare benefit
of four QALYs (0.2 times twenty).11

7. See Matthew D. Adler, QALYs and Policy Evaluation: A New Perspective, 6 YALE J. HEALTH
POL’Y L. & ETHICS 1, 50–52 (2006) (discussing difficulties with attempting to implement WHOQOL on
a policy level).
8. See, e.g., Robert W. Hahn & Cass R. Sunstein, A New Executive Order for Improving Federal
Regulation? Deeper and Wider Cost-Benefit Analysis, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1489, 1489 (2002) (“For over
twenty years, the executive branch of the federal government has required regulatory agencies to assess
the costs and benefits of regulation, and to attempt to ensure that the benefits outweigh, or justify, the
costs.”).
9. Indeed, the D.C. Circuit’s opinion in American Trucking Ass’ns, Inc. v. EPA, 175 F.3d 1027,
1039–40 (D.C. 1999), rev’d in part, 531 U.S. 457 (2001), indicated that the EPA might be able to cure
constitutional problems relating to non-delegation by using a QALY-based approach.
10. See, e.g., Steven D. Pearson & Michael D. Rawlins, Quality, Innovation, and Value for Money:
NICE and the British National Health Service, 294 JAMA 2618 (2005); David A. Henry, Suzanne R.
Hill & Anthony Harris, Drug Prices and Value for Money: The Australian Pharmaceutical Benefits
Scheme, 294 JAMA 2630 (2005).
11. Needless to say, this example is quite stylized. A valuable recent book on QALYs is PETER J.
NEUMANN, USING COST-EFFECTIVENESS ANALYSIS TO IMPROVE HEALTH CARE: OPPORTUNITIES
AND BARRIERS (2005). Other standard accounts of cost-effectiveness analysis include MICHAEL F.
DRUMMOND ET AL., METHODS FOR THE ECONOMIC EVALUATIONS OF HEALTH CARE
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The QALY-based approach has limitations. A voluminous literature
documents controversies over implementation details—for example, it is not
clear that respondents in perfect health are the appropriate population to
survey in determining the quality-of-life figure that should be attached to a
particular suboptimal health state.12 Additionally, QALYs obviously focus only
on physical and psychological health. They do not take into account various
other conditions—social, environmental, spiritual—that may have an equal or
greater impact on welfare. Nonetheless, in evaluating policy, including
intellectual property policy, for those areas in which the primary impact is likely
to be on health, they represent a reasonably tractable and transparent
mechanism that can correct for various cognitive biases.13 Thus, many Western
countries use a QALY-based approach to coverage of medical interventions.
For example, the British National Health Service does not generally cover
interventions that cost more than $50,000 per QALY gained.14
Of course, the use of QALY-based analysis by payors is an indirect
mechanism for channeling biomedical innovation in a direction that maximizes
QALYs. Indeed, a payor-based approach does not involve intellectual property
policy per se at all. Rather, it relies upon standards adopted by demand-side
institutions. A more intellectual-property-based approach to maximizing
QALYs might involve a patent prize system that calibrated rewards based on
the number of QALYs produced by the technology.15 After the prize had been
given, the technology in question could be made available at marginal cost. This
biomedical-innovation regulatory puzzle thus presents the question of whether
insurance or intellectual property is the appropriate institution for promoting
welfare and reducing deadweight loss. More generally, intellectual property
policy analysts who aim to increase welfare must consider what institution is
best suited for the task.
III
CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS
As a theoretical matter, the difference between a universal health-insurance
scheme that relies on QALY-based purchasing and QALY-based prizes is not

PROGRAMMES (1987); M.R. Gold et al., Cost-Effectiveness in Health and Medicine, 276 JAMA 1253
(1996).
12. Some have argued that the relevant survey population should be those who are living in the
particular suboptimal health state. These individuals often have higher valuations of their health state
than those who have not experienced it. Other implementation questions include whether health
benefits should be discounted and whether individual tradeoffs between quality and quantity of life are
sufficiently diverse that it is inappropriate to average them.
13. See Arti K. Rai, Pharmacogenetic Interventions, Orphan Groups, and Distributive Justice, 19
SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y 246, 256–57 (making this point).
14. PEARSON & RAWLINS, supra note 10, at 2619.
15. Aidan Hollis, An Efficient Reward System for Pharmaceutical Innovation (Jan. 17, 2005),
available at http://econ.ucalgary.ca/fac-files/ah/drugprizes.pdf.
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large.16 Even the political economy of these proposals may not differ
significantly, at least in industrialized countries where the primary purchaser of
health-related technology is the government. In both cases, government officials
will presumably be subject to significant lobbying by industry groups.
Moreover, in both cases, government officials should bear primary
responsibility for generating, or otherwise securing, the public good of unbiased
cost-effectiveness data upon which to base their decisions.
In the United States, by contrast, the institutional calculus is somewhat
different. Most obviously, unlike programs in other countries, U.S. healthinsurance programs—whether private or public—have generally not used costper-QALY analysis.17 Thus, at least until recently, insurance-induced moral
hazard (the tendency of insured individuals to consume more health care than
they would if they were paying full cost) has combined with the quasi-monopoly
power allowed by patents to produce significant growth in biopharmaceutical
expenditures and insurance premiums. This is true even in cases in which the
biopharmaceutical technology in question has a small marginal health benefit
relative to its marginal cost.18 Meanwhile, the deadweight loss of monopoly
persists for the significant percentage of Americans who are priced out of
insurance.19 Moreover, although there is some evidence that certain privatesector plans may be moving towards sub rosa reliance on cost-effectiveness
criteria, such sub rosa adoption based on data of uncertain provenance is hardly
equivalent to a rational system.
Many scholars, myself included, have proposed replacing the dysfunctional
U.S. system with universal, voucher-based access to plans that compete based
on cost-effectiveness criteria. This mixture of regulation and markets would
avoid political economy-related concerns that might be raised by a more
centralized system of health-care purchase while simultaneously promoting
health-related welfare goals. But given the uncertain prospects for a rational
system on the demand side—the struggle for universal coverage based on costeffectiveness criteria has been waged and lost many times in U.S history—an
institutional option worth considering may be experimentation on the
intellectual property side. In other words, the possibility of experimentation

16. In both cases, decisionmakers have to evaluate, for example, whether the first drug in a class
that achieves an appropriate QALY gain should be the one that is covered or rewarded, even in cases
in which a later drug may be marginally better.
17. See, e.g., Peter Neumann, Why Don’t Americans Use Cost-Effectiveness Analysis?, 10 AM. J.
MANAGED CARE 308 (2004).
18. By insulating consumers from cost at the point of purchase, insurance reduces the deadweight
loss associated with monopoly pricing. See Arti K. Rai, The Information Revolution Reaches
Pharmaceuticals, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 173, 201 (2001). However, unless insurance companies rely on
some mechanism of cost-effectiveness analysis in making coverage decisions, the advantage of
deadweight-loss reduction is accompanied by the disadvantage that pharmaceutical firms can make
large sums of money on interventions that produce relatively low marginal social-welfare benefit. Id. at
206 (discussing examples).
19. There is also considerable evidence that the prices paid by insurance plans are lower than
prices paid by uninsured individuals.
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with prizes calibrated according to number of QALYs achieved deserves
serious attention.
A QALY-based prize proposal has considerable promise in the
international arena as well. Many commentators have argued that there is a
10/90 gap in worldwide R&D expenditures—only ten percent of global R&D is
addressed to ninety percent of the world’s disease burden. Although this
particular figure has been the subject of some controversy, there can be little
doubt that a patent-based system can allocate significant resources only towards
those diseases that have some market. By itself, a patent regime will not
produce sufficient research on neglected diseases such as tuberculosis, let alone
“very neglected diseases” such as African sleeping sickness (trypanosomiasis)
and African river blindness (onchocerciasis).20 In addition to reward approaches
based on QALY benefits, advanced purchase commitments for vaccines of
specified efficacy21 and “open source” approaches22 may also have promise.
Finally, it bears emphasis that these health-related proposals do not need to
engage the important debate over whether welfare concerns that diverge from
efficiency goals are best addressed through broad-based tax and transfer
systems or through more focused regulatory measures.23 This is because a prize
based on QALYs would presumably be paid out of general revenue, rather than
through some narrowly focused levy. But intellectual property scholars
confronting tensions between welfare and efficiency in other areas will surely
have to engage this debate.24
IV
CONCLUSION
A welfare-based approach to intellectual property has promise, at least in
areas in which analysts have devised tractable metrics for welfare. To be sure,
such an approach will not cover all the goals that intellectual property scholars
should address. But it does represent a concrete mechanism for incorporating
within intellectual property analysis the broader social policy goals suggested by
Boyle’s book.

20. The terms “neglected” and “very neglected” diseases are taken from the Report of the
Commission on Macroeconomics and Health. See COMMISSION ON MACROECONOMICS AND HEALTH,
MACROECONOMICS & HEALTH: INVESTING IN HEALTH FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 78 (2001),
available at http://www.cid.harvard.edu/cidcmh/CMHReport.pdf.
21. Ernst Berndt et al., Advanced Purchase Commitments for a Malaria Vaccine: Estimating Costs
and Effectiveness (Working Paper, 2005), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=696741.
22. Stephen Maurer et al., Finding Cures for Tropical Diseases: Is Open Source An Answer?, 1
PLOS MEDICINE 180 (Dec. 2004).
23. Compare Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Why the Legal System is Less Efficient Than the
Income Tax in Redistributing Income, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 677 (1994) with Chris Sanchirico,
Deconstructing the New Efficiency Rationale, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 1003 (2001).
24. For some discussion of this question, see Arti K. Rai, Leveraging Innovation for Welfare: Do’s
and Don’ts (May 15, 2007) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).

